Question: Does suicide terrorism help Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda achieve their goals?
-Topic from: Bin Laden, Osama. “Declaration of Jihad Against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques.” In The Human Record: Volume II, ed. Alfred J. Andrea and James H. Overfield, 517-522, 5th ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005.
Source: Pape, Robert A. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003).
The Rationality of Irrationality: Analyzing Suicide Terrorism
Robert A. Pape’s The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism is a groundbreaking article in the field of political science, and one with massive implications to the fractured and violent international stage. Using statistical analysis of suicide terrorist actions from 1980 to 2001, he discovers an important new reality (15-18). Suicide terrorism is utterly logical, while traditional knowledge views suicide as a completely illogical action (2). Identifying sixteen separate suicide terrorist campaigns in those twenty-one years, Pape proves that the goal of organizations using suicide terrorism is for territorial concessions from a strong institution to a weak one, usually in the name of self-determination, and that it is much more effective than plain terrorism (1, 6).
The relevant campaign towards my question, however, is campaign #12: al Qaeda against the United States of America. Al Qaeda’s major goal is the removal of the American presence from the Saudi peninsula, a revered Muslim holy land (4, 7). This campaign was just starting when Osama Bin Laden gave the aforementioned speech in 1996, and al Qaeda actions intensified in the next five years, including the bombings of the USS Cole, American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and most infamously, the horrors of September 11th (17). Al Qaeda have continued on their campaign since 2001, culminating in the 7/7 bombings of London’s Subway system.
Pape covers several intriguing and relevant statistics in his report. In the twenty-one year period used, Pape finds that suicide bombings kill an average of thirteen people each (not counting September 11th), while normal terrorist actions kill an average of 0.78 people (4, 5). As well, again excluding 9/11, suicide terrorism made up forty-eight percent of total terrorism deaths, while only amounting to three percent of total terrorist actions (5). These numbers prove the effectiveness of suicide terrorism, shown in the rampant escalation of suicide actions in those twenty-one years, while normal terrorist actions are on a downward trend (1). Of the sixteen suicide campaigns, eleven have concluded, with six of these ending up with territorial gains or political concessions from the stronger group to the weaker, a fifty-five percent success rate (9). Pape contrasts this to information of how ‘normal’ international actions towards coercion, through military or economic means, succeed less than one-third of the time (9). The example of Hamas’ suicide campaign against Israel in the mid-90s, which resulted in significant concessions from Israel, is used by Pape as an integral case study to prove his thesis on suicide terrorism (1). Terrorist organizations have learned from their past actions that suicide bombing is far more effective than normal action, as Pape displays, in terms of violent conclusions, sending a message, and ultimately forcing territorial concessions (4, 5, 8).
Starting with a broad conversation of defining suicide terrorism, Pape shows how suicide terrorism has rapidly escalated since the ‘success’ of the 1983 bombing of a US embassy in Beirut (1). Arguing against the conventional knowledge that suicide terrorism is an act of fanatical madmen, he then goes on to prove that “suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic, one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions (1).” Pape continues to make a point of how irrational individuals have their place in a suicide bombing. They are the street-level side of the operation, who are then overseen by logical organizations and strategic masterminds (5). These latter figures use religion as a justification to pull the strings of those that would commit suicide in the name of a goal or a God (5). The argument that Pape creates is boiled down to how suicide terrorism is simply the most effective way of compelling concessions and enforcing political change. Though initially a last-ditch strategy of the underdog, suicide terrorism has become a logical method of coercion because of its tremendous effectiveness (9).
The core aspects of Pape’s article are his lists containing various features of suicide terrorism. The five principles of suicide terrorism, for example, are: 1) suicide terrorism is strategic, 2) the strategic logic of suicide terrorism is specifically designed to coerce modern democracies to make significant concessions to national self-determination, 3) suicide terrorism has been steadily rising because terrorists have learned of its effectiveness, 4) moderate suicide terrorism leads to moderate concessions, and the more ambitious suicide campaigns are not likely to achieve still greater gains and may well fail completely, and 5) the most promising way to contain suicide terrorism is to reduce terrorists’ confidence in their abilities to carry out such attacks (2). Pape fleshes out these points in great detail throughout his work, and it is the latter points 4 and 5 that are most relevant to the discussion of al Qaeda, and the ones that prove the veracity of Pape’s arguments. We have seen the most ambitious attacks of all from al-Qaeda, on military ships, embassies, subway systems, and most significantly, the World Trade Center. Yet al-Qaeda’s goal of a strictly Wahhabist Arabian peninsula, autonomous of American influence, has not come to fruition. Indeed, the Saudi monarchy has increasingly been seen working both with the American government, and multinational American corporation. This is a far cry from the days of suicide bombings forcing the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. The more ambitious suicide campaign of al-Qaeda can be seen as strengthening the resolve of its enemies and targets, the opposite affect of the sought after consequences, and a prime example that proves Pape’s 4th point.
The article concludes with Pape’s 5th point, an attempt to offer the greatest possible solution to the plague of suicide terrorism. He shows that the best way to foil those that would spread terror and fear is through increased homeland security, by frustrating the ways and means of terror (14). This is best seen in the summer of 2006, where increased security led to the prevention of potentially devastating airplane bombings. Pape’s article and its conclusions are extremely relevant, to both the modern socioeconomic situation of the world, and to the topic of al-Qaeda’s continuing campaign against America.
Saturday, March 3, 2007
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