After finishing out a rather stressful period, I again return to my favourite form of retail therapy- renting out half the damn library. Cheap, literate, and fulfilling. I haven't even finished the last load of books. We have:
White- The Making of the President, 1964
McGinnis- The selling of the president, 1968
Flanagan- Waiting for the wave
Schlesinger- The cycles of american history
Schlesinger- The politics of hope
Clarkson- the big red machine
Davey- the rainmaker
Machiavelli- the prince
Camp- an eclectic eel
I was considering renting Black's Duplessis, but goddamn, that is one massive tome.
Wednesday, April 4, 2007
Uninhibited Scholasticism
Two more essays from school, about al Qaeda and then the UN.
The Rationality of Irrationality:
Analyzing al Qaeda’s Campaign of Suicide Terrorism and its Effectiveness
The terror, fear, and destruction unleashed upon the world by Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda have shaken the Western nations to their core. The Islamic group has unleashed a campaign of suicide terrorism, led by their rich and charismatic leader , aimed at Western nations and their Middle Eastern supporters. Their campaign rests on the hypothesis, best summarized by Robert A. Pape in his paper “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” that suicide terrorism is driven by a quest for territorial or political concessions from a larger nation to a smaller group, and that it is utterly rational in its effectiveness . Pape organizes suicide actions from 1980-2001 into sixteen separate campaigns . Eleven of these have concluded, with six of them ending up with territorial gains or political concessions from the stronger group to the weaker, a fifty-five percent ‘success’ rate . This is compared to ‘normal’ international actions towards coercion, through military or economic means, that succeed less than one-third of the time . Citing such campaigns as Hamas or Hezbollah versus Israel, Pape displays that a persistent campaign of suicide terrorism can force moderate concessions . Al Qaeda’s campaign has included attacks escalating in scale, from earlier bombings of American embassies and military bases, to a nightclub in Bali, to the 2005 London and 2004 Madrid subway bombings, all culminating in the horrors of 9/11 . Their usual style of large and very visible attacks, often resulting in hundreds dead and thousands injured, is unusual when compared to Pape’s other recognized campaigns, where groups such as the Tamil Tigers or Hezbollah launched numerous smaller attacks. These latter tactics were proven more effective than normal means of coercion and, logically, al Qaeda’s attacks, with their increasing scope, would then bring increased action towards their goals. However, the suicide terrorist campaign of al Qaeda doesn’t help them achieve their goals because of the sheer self-defeating scope of these goals, and the increasing resolve that al Qaeda inspires in its enemies.
Speaking in his 1996 “Declaration of Jihad Against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques,” Osama Bin Laden outlines his grievances, and the goals of his burgeoning suicide terrorism campaign that would eventually lead to the devastation of 9/11. He speaks of his desire for a Pan-Arabic Nation stretching across the Middle East, ruled by Sharia law and autonomous of Western influences, a goal harkening back to the days of the Ottoman caliphate . These concepts of Islamic nationalism and protectionism are concurrent in his declaration; however, Bin Laden usually comes down to one main theme:
“The latest and the greatest of these aggressions experienced by the Muslims since the death of the Prophet is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places, the foundation of the House of Islam, the place of the revelation, the sources of the message and the place of the noble Kabah, the Qiblah of all Muslims. ”
American forces established bases in Saudi Arabia during the First Gulf War, to protect American energy interests in the region against the aggression of Saddam Hussein. The “Land of the Two Holy Mosques,” Saudi Arabia, is the holiest site in Islam, as it contains the holy cities of Mecca and Medina . The House of Saud’s complacency with the American government, and with Western energy corporations, allows Bin Laden to tie Islamic fundamentalism into Arab nationalism, making them an intertwined cause. These territorial grievances fit Pape’s theory of suicide terrorism campaigns existing for the sake of forcing geographical and political concessions. Bin Laden’s major motivation is shown to be freeing the Arabian peninsula, with its extreme religious relevance and its more earthly oil reserves, of American military and economic influence over the ruling House of Saud . The difference, though, between Hamas using suicide terrorism to force Israel from the Palestinian territories, and al Qaeda flying planes into buildings in their crusade against America, is the scope of the expected concession. An integral idea in Pape’s work is that:
“Suicide terrorism can coerce states to abandon limited or modest goals, such as withdrawal from territory of low strategic importance or, as in Israel’s case in 1994 and 1995, a temporary and partial withdrawal from a more important one. However, suicide terrorism is unlikely to cause targets to abandon goals central to their wealth or security. ”
Pape and Bin Laden both use as an example the American withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983 after a deadly suicide attack on an American embassy. Bin Laden trumpets it as an example of how the Americans are a “paper tiger,” of how once al Qaeda spills American blood, the Westerners will lose their resolve and leave . Though the Americans did withdraw in 1983, Pape displays that is was a humanitarian mission and success was not critical to their national security . Thus, the more important of a concession that a group are trying to achieve, the less likely it’ll occur. The goals of al Qaeda are ambitions indeed, as they want to end the reign of the House of Saud, end Western energy interests in Arabia, create a Pan-Arabic Islamic state, and force an American military withdrawal from both Arabia and Iraq. Unfortunately for Bin Laden, the House of Saud has endlessly deep pockets to support themselves, the West lives in a culture driven by petroleum where natural energy is central to living a comfortable life, the Middle East seems more interested in Shia-Sunni sectarian violence than unity, and American forces aren’t relenting from their support of Israel, and other friendly regimes in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Turkey. Al Qaeda’s goals are a far cry from the simple self-determination of a small area that both Hamas and Hezbollah campaign for. Al Qaeda has recognized the scope of their goals, and then increased the scope of their attacks to a visibility and deadliness not yet seen in the history of suicide terrorism, all in the name of forcing these massive concessions, and yet they’re no closer to achieving them than they were in 1996.
A central tenant to Bernard Lewis’ ideas about al Qaeda is that Bin Laden views his struggle as one of the underdog. Lewis theorizes that Bin Laden believes his Mujahedeen’s defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan directly led to its collapse of the Soviet regime. Viewing the Soviet Union as the stronger, both militarily and politically, of the two Cold War superpowers, Bin Laden then believes that he’s knocked off the harder of the two, so the United States wouldn’t stand a chance . However, instead of collapsing like a “paper tiger” after the horrors of 9/11, 7/7, and a myriad of other bombings, the Western world’s resolve has strengthened. The Taliban, al Qaeda’s primary supporting regime, was ousted in a shocking display of American military might. Though the Taliban still exists as a political force in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it has taken grievous losses in leadership, manpower, and influence since 9/11, and its degradation has been reflected in the ruin of al Qaeda. Still acting as an international force and influence, with many attacks carried out in Iraq, and the 7/7 and Madrid bombings claimed to their name, the organization has become more of a figurehead of religious Pan-Arab nationalism. The latter attacks, examples of the increased scope that al Qaeda works with, were carried out by semi-autonomous groups that then claimed to be part of al Qaeda. In that sense, since the logistical hammering it took in Afghanistan, al Qaeda has become more of a ‘brand name’ than a tight terrorist organization. As well, both the United States and the United Kingdom have ramped up domestic security, which Pape theorizes is the best way to combat suicide terrorism .
The effect of this is seen in the absence of domestic terrorism in these countries, since 9/11 and then 7/7, though not due to lack of effort by al Qaeda and other affiliated groups. Since increasing the scale of its suicide activities, al Qaeda has lost its primary home and training grounds in Afghanistan, and has been driven to dwelling in caves in the rugged mountainous frontiers of Pakistan.
Pape displays that suicide terrorism is a rational and often effective means of gaining territorial concessions. Al Qaeda’s goals are vast in scope and ambition, as they work towards achieving Pan-Arabic dominance in the Middle East, and autonomy for their holy Arabian Peninsula. However, their campaign of suicide terrorism hasn’t followed the usual path of such groups as Hamas and Hezbollah, as they have carried out one with more visible and devastating attacks. The reaction to these tactics haven’t been collapse, as Bin Laden believes with his ‘paper tiger’ theory, but have been the strengthening of Western resolve, of domestic security, and of foreign actions against these Islamic aggressors. The unique suicide terrorism campaign of al Qaeda has failed at achieving their ambitious goals, thanks to the very nature and scope of these goals, and the reactionary effects that their enhanced attacks have caused.
Something Rotten in the State of Denmark:
The Crucial Failings of the United Nations
The UN and its Security Council exist as an attempt to hold nation-states accountable to a multilateral, supranational legalistic system. After death and destruction choked the 20th Century world a second time, the UN was produced in 1945 as an attempt to create collective security. Unfortunately, the organization has become dangerously archaic and impotent. In Glennon’s “Why the Security Council Failed,” he writes of how the 2003 Iraq War spelled the doom of the UN, as the unilateral US ignored the Security Council, and thus made a mockery of the idea of firm international law . He argues that the idea of a multilateral council to keep the world secure has been unsuccessful in the face of reality and the power-hungry, self-serving nation-states that multilateralism empowers . The ‘hyperstate’ that is the US could ignore the Security Council and end the attempts at multilateralism that China, Russia, and France were trying to establish through the Council . Glennon’s main theory that the 2003 Iraq situation heralded the death of the Security Council’s usefulness is perhaps rather late, as it could be argued that the UN lost all legitimacy when eight-hundred thousand Rwandans died under UN watch. Tharoor, on the other hand, argues that the UN is still very relevant, and that Glennon didn’t look at the larger scale of things . He states that the 2003 Iraqi situation is only one isolated incident, and that the UN makes an easy scapegoat for the world’s ills . Tharoor emphasis that it does much good in terms of world heath and wellbeing that goes unnoticed, and that the US participates and benefits from inclusion . The core of Tharoor’s argument is that multilateralism is “a means, not an end, ” and that the inclusiveness of the UN gives its decisions and resolutions extra legitimacy. Tharoor, a UN Undersecretary-General, gives an obviously unbiased account of his employer’s uses, and his squealing about positive multilateralism only looks all the more feckless when compared to the killing fields of Kigali, Srebrenica, and Darfur. Given the Security Council’s core mandate of maintaining international peace and security, this essay will argue that the UN loses its legitimacy because of its blind inclusiveness and the failures in international security that ensue. These failures are all the more blatant because hundreds of thousands of people, hypothetically protected by the UN, usually end up in misery or dying as a result.
A business that succeeds at many small things, such as keeping its employers well stocked with staplers and fun HR games, but fails at balancing its budget and making a profit, will go down in infamy as a doomed venture. Keeping roads well-maintained and schools open are all positive things for a government to work on. However, if the government then proceeds to ruin the economy, harm millions of citizens fiscally in the process, and thus fail at its main mandate, then the government won’t be kept in office. Why should the UN be treated any differently? Glennon argues that the 2003 Iraqi situation spells the death knell of the Security Council’s usefulness; however, using just recent examples, Iraq is seen as just one in a long list of spectacular, and often bloody, failures of international security. The crucial faults are obvious to any idiot with five minutes to spare watching the news. The failings of the UN to provide security aren’t really the fault of hard-working diplomats, but exist within the very structure of the Council’s mandate. A Security Council exists where countries have permanent vetoes on issues that they themselves are perpetuating. A slow genocide exists in Darfur, yet another in what appears a wearying storm of dying central Africans (how dare that they keep dying and taking TV time away from American Idol); however, because the UN values state sovereignty above all, the Council needs the consent of either the Sudanese government to peace keep in Sudan, or of the permanent Council members so as to halt the genocide with the stricter measures enabled by Chapter XII of the Charter. The problem then is that the Sudanese government is the main backer of the genocidal militias in Darfur, and that because China has extensive interests in Darfur’s natural energy sector, they’ll support the Sudanese government. Tharoor’s glorification of inclusive multilateralism that supposedly gives Security Council resolutions legitimacy is fine until that very multilateralism starts to work against the people of the nations it represents. If a member of the Security Council is the backer or perpetrator of a gross violation of human security, then Tharoor’s multilateralism legitimizes genocidal thugs. This is the fundamental problem of credibility that the UN faces- if they can’t stop the worst human rights violations, what justifies their existence? Tharoor states that we shouldn’t radically reform the international security structure because “One would not close down the Senate (or even the Texas legislature) because its members failed to agree on one bill .” The essential difference that Tharoor misses is that eight-hundred thousand Tutsis aren’t butchered in the streets of Houston when the Texas legislature fails to pass a bill. He also states that “When the UN Security Council passes a resolution, it is seen as speaking for (and in the interests of) humanity as a whole .” That is fine and all, but the resolutions that really matter aren’t the ones passed, but the ones not being passed because of the selfish interests of individual states. These missed resolutions are the ones that result in a copious amount of human beings dead and a massive blemish on the face of the Security Council. Tharoor manages to make a number of good points in favour of the UN, though; of the humanitarian works done through such organizations as the WHO, and of how there is a long streak of peacekeeping successes . However, with multilateral programs concerning food and disease, there’s not much use vaccinating and feeding a Rwandan if he’s then going to be hacked to death with a machete a few years later. No person or organization is perfect, but when you’re dealing with the lives of millions, you’d better be damn close to perfection. The very inclusiveness that Tharoor trumpets is the major factor in the collapse of the UN in its ability to act as an effective security force in the world.
The failure of the Security Council to fulfill its mandate then leaves a vacuum for security, one that is now filled by ‘hyperstates’ in a unilateral system. The Westphalian system of clearly defined nation-state sovereignty, and multilateral internationalism that was further modeled at the Congress of Vienna, is an obsolete system. Glennon speaks of how each singular nation will use its own available options to further its goals . The US will use unilateral force to further theirs, and because France doesn’t have anywhere near as much hard power as the US, it’ll use the available methods- it’s archaic spot as a permanent member on the Security Council. France’s opposition of the US had nothing to do with ideology or ‘right and wrong,’ and everything to do with exerting long-lost influence, and propping up a fascist Iraqi regime that helpfully gobbled up French arms and weaponry. Another view on Glennon is the historical one. Europe, of all continents, has faced the horrors that unabashed nation-statism has created, of balances of power, arms races, and eventually world wars. Logically, Europe would’ve then learned from these experiences and then moved on to the view that a supranational organization such as the European Union is the best way forward for European peace. So far, it looks like they’re correct, as France and Germany seem far more interested in bashing Americans than squabbling over Alsace-Lorraine. However, these examples of supranational continental organizations aren’t rare, as we see the success stories of NATO, NAFTA, the EU, the burgeoning AU, and others. The problem that Glennon and this essay then face is how to create a successful supranational organization dedicated to true global security? When the UN Human Rights Council contains such benevolent purveyors of human rights as Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Venezuela, then it isn’t hard to see the main issue with a truly inclusive organization . Perhaps dangling a large carrot on a stick in front of nations, the carrot being inclusion to the UN, bringing all the smaller benefits that Tharoor trumpets, in exchange for acceptable human right levels, might create positive change. If being ostracized from the UN, and the international community, is what is necessary to force China to stop its harvesting of Falun Gong member’s organs, Russia’s regime to stop murdering journalists, Iran to stop stoning women to death for being raped, and Saudi Arabia to recognize that women deserve a better societal status than camels, then ostracizing is what is called for. There are many benefits to being included in the UN, as Tharoor helpfully points out, and those benefits are the best way to force change in regimes. There’s no point in inclusiveness for the sake of security if those included are the ones shattering the security. China is supporting genocidal regimes in the Sudan and Zimbabwe (hey, highest inflation and lowest life-expectancy in the world), with economic and political measures, and yet China has a voice on the Security Council equal or greater to many other nations that manage to have a basic inkling towards the inherent right’s of mankind. This kind of multilateralism, pandering to feckless thugs, brutal theocrats, and incoherent communists, and allowing them an equal voice to nations that give a fig for human rights, is contradictory to everything the UN mandate sets out to achieve. Tharoor’s idea of inclusiveness breeding legitimacy is ultimately self-defeating, as history has proven again and again, upon some dry Central African plain, or in the midst of an Asian jungle, as preventable conflicts turn into burning orgies of human despair, while the organization that tasks itself with stopping these horrors is sustained by bowing to purveyors of the same terror and fear.
Glennon’s article is a sounding for reform in the bureaucratic nightmare of the UN. Unfortunately, this call is a bit too late for a number of Africans and Europeans who have already been butchered in the name of racism, abject nationalism, and plain old rage, while the UN stands idly by. As stated before, the Security Council didn’t become outdated when a blithe US skipped by and invaded Iraq in 2003, it lost all meaning when eight-hundred thousand Rwandans were hacked to bits while Americans (paging Madeleine Albright) spent their time “ducking and pressuring others to duck, as the death toll leapt from thousands to tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. ” No nation in this world is innocent of harming international security to some extent; however, this malaise of cultural relativism has led the UN and the international community to believe that an entirely corrupt and depraved regime in China is the better of numerous Western nations that have spent their political capital desperately furthering the cause of human rights. Entrance to a supranational organization that brings benefits and true legitimacy to its members must be accountable, so that Americans ignoring the Geneva Convention in secret CIA prisons, and Chinese harvesting the organs of political minorities, are both held to a universal standard of human rights and belonging. Only through offering a large enough stick to shake, in terms of soft power and humanitarian benefit, can the UN become truly legitimate. Otherwise, more time will continue to be spent sitting back and watching the latest African crisis on CNN.
The Rationality of Irrationality:
Analyzing al Qaeda’s Campaign of Suicide Terrorism and its Effectiveness
The terror, fear, and destruction unleashed upon the world by Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda have shaken the Western nations to their core. The Islamic group has unleashed a campaign of suicide terrorism, led by their rich and charismatic leader , aimed at Western nations and their Middle Eastern supporters. Their campaign rests on the hypothesis, best summarized by Robert A. Pape in his paper “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” that suicide terrorism is driven by a quest for territorial or political concessions from a larger nation to a smaller group, and that it is utterly rational in its effectiveness . Pape organizes suicide actions from 1980-2001 into sixteen separate campaigns . Eleven of these have concluded, with six of them ending up with territorial gains or political concessions from the stronger group to the weaker, a fifty-five percent ‘success’ rate . This is compared to ‘normal’ international actions towards coercion, through military or economic means, that succeed less than one-third of the time . Citing such campaigns as Hamas or Hezbollah versus Israel, Pape displays that a persistent campaign of suicide terrorism can force moderate concessions . Al Qaeda’s campaign has included attacks escalating in scale, from earlier bombings of American embassies and military bases, to a nightclub in Bali, to the 2005 London and 2004 Madrid subway bombings, all culminating in the horrors of 9/11 . Their usual style of large and very visible attacks, often resulting in hundreds dead and thousands injured, is unusual when compared to Pape’s other recognized campaigns, where groups such as the Tamil Tigers or Hezbollah launched numerous smaller attacks. These latter tactics were proven more effective than normal means of coercion and, logically, al Qaeda’s attacks, with their increasing scope, would then bring increased action towards their goals. However, the suicide terrorist campaign of al Qaeda doesn’t help them achieve their goals because of the sheer self-defeating scope of these goals, and the increasing resolve that al Qaeda inspires in its enemies.
Speaking in his 1996 “Declaration of Jihad Against Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques,” Osama Bin Laden outlines his grievances, and the goals of his burgeoning suicide terrorism campaign that would eventually lead to the devastation of 9/11. He speaks of his desire for a Pan-Arabic Nation stretching across the Middle East, ruled by Sharia law and autonomous of Western influences, a goal harkening back to the days of the Ottoman caliphate . These concepts of Islamic nationalism and protectionism are concurrent in his declaration; however, Bin Laden usually comes down to one main theme:
“The latest and the greatest of these aggressions experienced by the Muslims since the death of the Prophet is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places, the foundation of the House of Islam, the place of the revelation, the sources of the message and the place of the noble Kabah, the Qiblah of all Muslims. ”
American forces established bases in Saudi Arabia during the First Gulf War, to protect American energy interests in the region against the aggression of Saddam Hussein. The “Land of the Two Holy Mosques,” Saudi Arabia, is the holiest site in Islam, as it contains the holy cities of Mecca and Medina . The House of Saud’s complacency with the American government, and with Western energy corporations, allows Bin Laden to tie Islamic fundamentalism into Arab nationalism, making them an intertwined cause. These territorial grievances fit Pape’s theory of suicide terrorism campaigns existing for the sake of forcing geographical and political concessions. Bin Laden’s major motivation is shown to be freeing the Arabian peninsula, with its extreme religious relevance and its more earthly oil reserves, of American military and economic influence over the ruling House of Saud . The difference, though, between Hamas using suicide terrorism to force Israel from the Palestinian territories, and al Qaeda flying planes into buildings in their crusade against America, is the scope of the expected concession. An integral idea in Pape’s work is that:
“Suicide terrorism can coerce states to abandon limited or modest goals, such as withdrawal from territory of low strategic importance or, as in Israel’s case in 1994 and 1995, a temporary and partial withdrawal from a more important one. However, suicide terrorism is unlikely to cause targets to abandon goals central to their wealth or security. ”
Pape and Bin Laden both use as an example the American withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983 after a deadly suicide attack on an American embassy. Bin Laden trumpets it as an example of how the Americans are a “paper tiger,” of how once al Qaeda spills American blood, the Westerners will lose their resolve and leave . Though the Americans did withdraw in 1983, Pape displays that is was a humanitarian mission and success was not critical to their national security . Thus, the more important of a concession that a group are trying to achieve, the less likely it’ll occur. The goals of al Qaeda are ambitions indeed, as they want to end the reign of the House of Saud, end Western energy interests in Arabia, create a Pan-Arabic Islamic state, and force an American military withdrawal from both Arabia and Iraq. Unfortunately for Bin Laden, the House of Saud has endlessly deep pockets to support themselves, the West lives in a culture driven by petroleum where natural energy is central to living a comfortable life, the Middle East seems more interested in Shia-Sunni sectarian violence than unity, and American forces aren’t relenting from their support of Israel, and other friendly regimes in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Turkey. Al Qaeda’s goals are a far cry from the simple self-determination of a small area that both Hamas and Hezbollah campaign for. Al Qaeda has recognized the scope of their goals, and then increased the scope of their attacks to a visibility and deadliness not yet seen in the history of suicide terrorism, all in the name of forcing these massive concessions, and yet they’re no closer to achieving them than they were in 1996.
A central tenant to Bernard Lewis’ ideas about al Qaeda is that Bin Laden views his struggle as one of the underdog. Lewis theorizes that Bin Laden believes his Mujahedeen’s defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan directly led to its collapse of the Soviet regime. Viewing the Soviet Union as the stronger, both militarily and politically, of the two Cold War superpowers, Bin Laden then believes that he’s knocked off the harder of the two, so the United States wouldn’t stand a chance . However, instead of collapsing like a “paper tiger” after the horrors of 9/11, 7/7, and a myriad of other bombings, the Western world’s resolve has strengthened. The Taliban, al Qaeda’s primary supporting regime, was ousted in a shocking display of American military might. Though the Taliban still exists as a political force in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it has taken grievous losses in leadership, manpower, and influence since 9/11, and its degradation has been reflected in the ruin of al Qaeda. Still acting as an international force and influence, with many attacks carried out in Iraq, and the 7/7 and Madrid bombings claimed to their name, the organization has become more of a figurehead of religious Pan-Arab nationalism. The latter attacks, examples of the increased scope that al Qaeda works with, were carried out by semi-autonomous groups that then claimed to be part of al Qaeda. In that sense, since the logistical hammering it took in Afghanistan, al Qaeda has become more of a ‘brand name’ than a tight terrorist organization. As well, both the United States and the United Kingdom have ramped up domestic security, which Pape theorizes is the best way to combat suicide terrorism .
The effect of this is seen in the absence of domestic terrorism in these countries, since 9/11 and then 7/7, though not due to lack of effort by al Qaeda and other affiliated groups. Since increasing the scale of its suicide activities, al Qaeda has lost its primary home and training grounds in Afghanistan, and has been driven to dwelling in caves in the rugged mountainous frontiers of Pakistan.
Pape displays that suicide terrorism is a rational and often effective means of gaining territorial concessions. Al Qaeda’s goals are vast in scope and ambition, as they work towards achieving Pan-Arabic dominance in the Middle East, and autonomy for their holy Arabian Peninsula. However, their campaign of suicide terrorism hasn’t followed the usual path of such groups as Hamas and Hezbollah, as they have carried out one with more visible and devastating attacks. The reaction to these tactics haven’t been collapse, as Bin Laden believes with his ‘paper tiger’ theory, but have been the strengthening of Western resolve, of domestic security, and of foreign actions against these Islamic aggressors. The unique suicide terrorism campaign of al Qaeda has failed at achieving their ambitious goals, thanks to the very nature and scope of these goals, and the reactionary effects that their enhanced attacks have caused.
Something Rotten in the State of Denmark:
The Crucial Failings of the United Nations
The UN and its Security Council exist as an attempt to hold nation-states accountable to a multilateral, supranational legalistic system. After death and destruction choked the 20th Century world a second time, the UN was produced in 1945 as an attempt to create collective security. Unfortunately, the organization has become dangerously archaic and impotent. In Glennon’s “Why the Security Council Failed,” he writes of how the 2003 Iraq War spelled the doom of the UN, as the unilateral US ignored the Security Council, and thus made a mockery of the idea of firm international law . He argues that the idea of a multilateral council to keep the world secure has been unsuccessful in the face of reality and the power-hungry, self-serving nation-states that multilateralism empowers . The ‘hyperstate’ that is the US could ignore the Security Council and end the attempts at multilateralism that China, Russia, and France were trying to establish through the Council . Glennon’s main theory that the 2003 Iraq situation heralded the death of the Security Council’s usefulness is perhaps rather late, as it could be argued that the UN lost all legitimacy when eight-hundred thousand Rwandans died under UN watch. Tharoor, on the other hand, argues that the UN is still very relevant, and that Glennon didn’t look at the larger scale of things . He states that the 2003 Iraqi situation is only one isolated incident, and that the UN makes an easy scapegoat for the world’s ills . Tharoor emphasis that it does much good in terms of world heath and wellbeing that goes unnoticed, and that the US participates and benefits from inclusion . The core of Tharoor’s argument is that multilateralism is “a means, not an end, ” and that the inclusiveness of the UN gives its decisions and resolutions extra legitimacy. Tharoor, a UN Undersecretary-General, gives an obviously unbiased account of his employer’s uses, and his squealing about positive multilateralism only looks all the more feckless when compared to the killing fields of Kigali, Srebrenica, and Darfur. Given the Security Council’s core mandate of maintaining international peace and security, this essay will argue that the UN loses its legitimacy because of its blind inclusiveness and the failures in international security that ensue. These failures are all the more blatant because hundreds of thousands of people, hypothetically protected by the UN, usually end up in misery or dying as a result.
A business that succeeds at many small things, such as keeping its employers well stocked with staplers and fun HR games, but fails at balancing its budget and making a profit, will go down in infamy as a doomed venture. Keeping roads well-maintained and schools open are all positive things for a government to work on. However, if the government then proceeds to ruin the economy, harm millions of citizens fiscally in the process, and thus fail at its main mandate, then the government won’t be kept in office. Why should the UN be treated any differently? Glennon argues that the 2003 Iraqi situation spells the death knell of the Security Council’s usefulness; however, using just recent examples, Iraq is seen as just one in a long list of spectacular, and often bloody, failures of international security. The crucial faults are obvious to any idiot with five minutes to spare watching the news. The failings of the UN to provide security aren’t really the fault of hard-working diplomats, but exist within the very structure of the Council’s mandate. A Security Council exists where countries have permanent vetoes on issues that they themselves are perpetuating. A slow genocide exists in Darfur, yet another in what appears a wearying storm of dying central Africans (how dare that they keep dying and taking TV time away from American Idol); however, because the UN values state sovereignty above all, the Council needs the consent of either the Sudanese government to peace keep in Sudan, or of the permanent Council members so as to halt the genocide with the stricter measures enabled by Chapter XII of the Charter. The problem then is that the Sudanese government is the main backer of the genocidal militias in Darfur, and that because China has extensive interests in Darfur’s natural energy sector, they’ll support the Sudanese government. Tharoor’s glorification of inclusive multilateralism that supposedly gives Security Council resolutions legitimacy is fine until that very multilateralism starts to work against the people of the nations it represents. If a member of the Security Council is the backer or perpetrator of a gross violation of human security, then Tharoor’s multilateralism legitimizes genocidal thugs. This is the fundamental problem of credibility that the UN faces- if they can’t stop the worst human rights violations, what justifies their existence? Tharoor states that we shouldn’t radically reform the international security structure because “One would not close down the Senate (or even the Texas legislature) because its members failed to agree on one bill .” The essential difference that Tharoor misses is that eight-hundred thousand Tutsis aren’t butchered in the streets of Houston when the Texas legislature fails to pass a bill. He also states that “When the UN Security Council passes a resolution, it is seen as speaking for (and in the interests of) humanity as a whole .” That is fine and all, but the resolutions that really matter aren’t the ones passed, but the ones not being passed because of the selfish interests of individual states. These missed resolutions are the ones that result in a copious amount of human beings dead and a massive blemish on the face of the Security Council. Tharoor manages to make a number of good points in favour of the UN, though; of the humanitarian works done through such organizations as the WHO, and of how there is a long streak of peacekeeping successes . However, with multilateral programs concerning food and disease, there’s not much use vaccinating and feeding a Rwandan if he’s then going to be hacked to death with a machete a few years later. No person or organization is perfect, but when you’re dealing with the lives of millions, you’d better be damn close to perfection. The very inclusiveness that Tharoor trumpets is the major factor in the collapse of the UN in its ability to act as an effective security force in the world.
The failure of the Security Council to fulfill its mandate then leaves a vacuum for security, one that is now filled by ‘hyperstates’ in a unilateral system. The Westphalian system of clearly defined nation-state sovereignty, and multilateral internationalism that was further modeled at the Congress of Vienna, is an obsolete system. Glennon speaks of how each singular nation will use its own available options to further its goals . The US will use unilateral force to further theirs, and because France doesn’t have anywhere near as much hard power as the US, it’ll use the available methods- it’s archaic spot as a permanent member on the Security Council. France’s opposition of the US had nothing to do with ideology or ‘right and wrong,’ and everything to do with exerting long-lost influence, and propping up a fascist Iraqi regime that helpfully gobbled up French arms and weaponry. Another view on Glennon is the historical one. Europe, of all continents, has faced the horrors that unabashed nation-statism has created, of balances of power, arms races, and eventually world wars. Logically, Europe would’ve then learned from these experiences and then moved on to the view that a supranational organization such as the European Union is the best way forward for European peace. So far, it looks like they’re correct, as France and Germany seem far more interested in bashing Americans than squabbling over Alsace-Lorraine. However, these examples of supranational continental organizations aren’t rare, as we see the success stories of NATO, NAFTA, the EU, the burgeoning AU, and others. The problem that Glennon and this essay then face is how to create a successful supranational organization dedicated to true global security? When the UN Human Rights Council contains such benevolent purveyors of human rights as Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Venezuela, then it isn’t hard to see the main issue with a truly inclusive organization . Perhaps dangling a large carrot on a stick in front of nations, the carrot being inclusion to the UN, bringing all the smaller benefits that Tharoor trumpets, in exchange for acceptable human right levels, might create positive change. If being ostracized from the UN, and the international community, is what is necessary to force China to stop its harvesting of Falun Gong member’s organs, Russia’s regime to stop murdering journalists, Iran to stop stoning women to death for being raped, and Saudi Arabia to recognize that women deserve a better societal status than camels, then ostracizing is what is called for. There are many benefits to being included in the UN, as Tharoor helpfully points out, and those benefits are the best way to force change in regimes. There’s no point in inclusiveness for the sake of security if those included are the ones shattering the security. China is supporting genocidal regimes in the Sudan and Zimbabwe (hey, highest inflation and lowest life-expectancy in the world), with economic and political measures, and yet China has a voice on the Security Council equal or greater to many other nations that manage to have a basic inkling towards the inherent right’s of mankind. This kind of multilateralism, pandering to feckless thugs, brutal theocrats, and incoherent communists, and allowing them an equal voice to nations that give a fig for human rights, is contradictory to everything the UN mandate sets out to achieve. Tharoor’s idea of inclusiveness breeding legitimacy is ultimately self-defeating, as history has proven again and again, upon some dry Central African plain, or in the midst of an Asian jungle, as preventable conflicts turn into burning orgies of human despair, while the organization that tasks itself with stopping these horrors is sustained by bowing to purveyors of the same terror and fear.
Glennon’s article is a sounding for reform in the bureaucratic nightmare of the UN. Unfortunately, this call is a bit too late for a number of Africans and Europeans who have already been butchered in the name of racism, abject nationalism, and plain old rage, while the UN stands idly by. As stated before, the Security Council didn’t become outdated when a blithe US skipped by and invaded Iraq in 2003, it lost all meaning when eight-hundred thousand Rwandans were hacked to bits while Americans (paging Madeleine Albright) spent their time “ducking and pressuring others to duck, as the death toll leapt from thousands to tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. ” No nation in this world is innocent of harming international security to some extent; however, this malaise of cultural relativism has led the UN and the international community to believe that an entirely corrupt and depraved regime in China is the better of numerous Western nations that have spent their political capital desperately furthering the cause of human rights. Entrance to a supranational organization that brings benefits and true legitimacy to its members must be accountable, so that Americans ignoring the Geneva Convention in secret CIA prisons, and Chinese harvesting the organs of political minorities, are both held to a universal standard of human rights and belonging. Only through offering a large enough stick to shake, in terms of soft power and humanitarian benefit, can the UN become truly legitimate. Otherwise, more time will continue to be spent sitting back and watching the latest African crisis on CNN.
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